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of land. Accordingly, on the theory that partition is not a sale of
land, but only a separation between joint owners or tenants in common of their respective interests in land, parol partitions have been
held valid."
In the great majority of the jurisdictions it has been held that
irrespective of whether the Statute of Frauds is applicable, parol partition is valid where the parties to the agreement have taken possession in severalty of the respective portions allotted to them pursuant to such agreement.12
In some cases, however, it has been held that a parol partition of
land is void as being within the Statute of
Frauds even though pos3
session in severalty is taken thereunder.'
In striking out the answer in the instant case, the court noted
the absence of any allegation therein that the defendants had been
induced to take or abstained from any action by the complainant's
alleged promise not to bring any suit for partition. The agreement
was executory on both sides and accordingly invalid within the terms
of the Statute of Frauds. When there has been an actual execution
of the oral contract equity will enforce the agreement.' 4
D. M. S.

TAXATION ESTATE TAX - APPORTIONMENT ESTATE LAw § 124.-This is a proceeding in the matter

DECEDENT

of the estate
of Ogden Livingston Mills, upon the final accounting of his executors.
The deceased created three revocable inter-vivos trusts for the
benefit of various individuals in the six-year period before his death
in 1937. The trustees object to the executors' proposed allocation of
estate taxes from the principal of said trusts on the ground that a
codicil to the decedent's will provides for the payment of such taxes
out of the general estate. Payment of counsel fees from the decedent's estate was also requested.
The codicil in dispute stated: "I direct that all estate, inheritance, transfer and succession taxes imposed upon my estate or any
"lMeacham v. Meacham, 91 Tenn. 532, 19 S. W. 757 (1892); McKnight
v. Bell, 135 Pa. 358, 19 Atl. 1036 (1890) ; Moore v. Kerr, 46 Ind. 468 (1874).
12 Sanger v. Merritt, 131 N. Y. 614, 30 N. E. 100 (1892) ; Taylor v. Millard, 118 N. Y. 244, 23 N. E. 376 (1890) ; Wood v. Fleet, 36 N. Y. 499 (1867);
Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N. Y. 257 (1850).
23 Fort v. Allen, 110 N. C. 183, 14 S. E. 685 (1892); Ballot v. Hale, 47
N. H. 347 (1867); Porter v. Hill, 9 Mass. 34 (1812).
.
14 Jones v. Jones, 118 App. Div. 148, 103 N. Y. Supp. 141 (1st Dep't 1907),
citing Wood v. Fleet, 36 N. Y. 499 (1867), and Taylor v. Millard, 118 N. Y.

244, 23 N. E. 376 (1890).
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part thereof, or the transfer thereof or any right of succession thereto,
be paid out of my general estate."
Held, judgment for the executors affirmed. There was no clear
direction in the will against apportionment, therefore the inter-vivos
trusts must bear their proportionate share of the estate tax in accord
with the New York Decedents Estate Law § 124. Surrogate's denial of application for allowances from the estate of the deceased
for services, by counsel for the inter-vivos trustees, was proper in
that this was an accounting, not a proceeding to construe a will.
Matter of Mills, 272 App. Div. 229, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 746 (1st Dep't
1947).
The source to be charged for federal estate taxes has never been
directly ruled upon, but there is substantial dicta indicating that it
is purely a question of local law. 1
The general interpretation of Federal 2 and New York State3
estate tax laws, is that estate taxes are payable out of the general
estate, unless otherwise directed by the testator, 4 in that it is a tax
upon the right to transfer and is computed from the artificial taxable
estate. This taxable estate contemplates all forms of transfer of the
decedent's property during his lifetime but effective at death, such
as by inter-vivos trust, gift, or otherwise. It also includes the true
testamentary estate which is that property of which the decedent was
owner at his death. 5
The effect of such interpretation is to increase the specific legacies
by the amount of the tax. To alleviate this burden on the residuary
legatees, who are usually the widow, children and/or close dependent
relatives of the deceased, there was recommended, 6 and the New York
State Legislature effectuated, 7 a change in the above rule so as to
apportion equitably federal and state estate taxes upon persons receiving the benefit of the estate, unless the testator directs otherwise.
Judicial interpretations have ruled this statute to be effective in the
absence of a clear, 8 unambiguous, 9 mandatory 10 direction."
Recent New York decisions have construed provisions of a
similar nature to the one in question, relied upon to relieve a devise
1 See Note, 142 A. L. R. 1135, 1146 (1942).
2 INT. REv. CODE § 812.

3N. Y.

TAx LAW

§ 249 (a).

4 YMCA v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 68 L. ed. 558 (1923); Farmers' L. & T.
Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y. 488, 144 N. E. 769 (1924); Matter of Hamlin,
226 N. Y. 407, 124 N. E. 4 (1919).
5N.Y. TAX LAW § 249(b) ; INT. REv. CODE § 812; Farmers' L. & T. Co.
v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y. 488, 144 N. E. 769 (1924).
6NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE DEFECTS IN THE LAWS OF

ESTATE, LEG. Doc. No. 69 (1930).
7 N. Y. DECEENT ESTATE LAW § 124.
8 Matter of Walbridge, 170 Misc. 127, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 907 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
9Matter of Kaufman, 170 Misc. 436, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 616 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
10 Matter of Durkee, 183 Misc. 382, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 721 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
11 Matter of Halle, 183 Misc. 858, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 375 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
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or bequest from estate taxes, as not exempting an inter-vivos trust
from payment of estate taxes. 12 The direction in Matter of Pennock, 13 "all administration expenses and taxes against my estate or
the legacies or bequests herein contained, shall be paid out of my
residuary estate and shall not be a charge against any legatee
therein," was held to apply solely to the true testamentary estate,
and therefore the inter-vivos trusts were held taxable, as transfers
intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after death.
The directior in Matter of Aldrich,14 "all legacy transfer inheritance
succession or estate taxes which may be assessed or imposed upon
any or the gifts legacies devises or provisions contained in this my
Will or upon my Estate shall be paid by my Executors out of and
charged against the principal of my residuary estate as an expense
of administration," emphasizes the point by determining the intent
of the testator to have directed against apportionment of estate taxes
from the inter-vivos trust, by reason of an added stipulation included
in the inter-vivos trust, to the effect that the trust would be liable
for transfer taxes if the residuary estate was insufficient.
The words of the codicil in question, "my estate," apart from
the context of the will, are not indicative of any one legal concept.Y1
Upon the tenor of the instrument as a whole, the court found the
words "my estate," as used in every other portion of the will, to
refer to the true, testamentary estate rather than the artificial taxable estate. Therefore, the inter-vivos trusts, being part of the artificial taxable estate, were not affected by the codicil's attempted evasion of the statute.
A further contention, that, in view of the decedent's position as
a practicing attorney and as Secretary of the Treasury, whose duty
it was to approve all tax regulations, that he intended to comply with
the statute, was held untenable. The intent of the testator cannot
be conclusively presumed to be applicable to the law when the will
was drawn, particularly when the ruling as to the inclusion of the
principal of the inter-vivos trust for testamentary tax purposes was
not settled until after the testator's death.' 6
Therefore, neither the will nor implications therefrom furnish
sustainable compliance with the statute and the judgment of the
court was in accord with the statutory rule.

12Matter

of Clark, 169 Misc. 202, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 176 (Surr. Ct 1939);

cf. Matter of Corlies, 174 Misc. 459, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 243 (Surr. Ct. 1940).

'3 172 Misc. 10, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 131 (Surr. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 285 N. Y. 475,
35 N. E. 2d 177 (1941).
'4 259 App. Div. 162, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 420 (2d Dep't 1940).
15 Matter of Duryea, 277 N. Y. 310, 14 N. E. 2d 369 (1938).
Is Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 84 L. ed. 604 (1940); Matter of
Pratt, 262 App. Div. 240, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 997 (2d Dep't 1941).
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There has been no established trend in other states to effectuate
similar results except in Pennsylvania 7 and Maryland. 8 However,
these cases will undoubtedly have a proper effect in that it will focus
attention on the overall aspects of attempting to draw legal instruments not only in the light of their immediate purpose, but to give
adequate consideration to the taxation problems which may arise in
future enforcement of the instruments.
L.W.

TORTS

INTERFERENCE WITH ADVANTAGEOUS RELATIONS ACT Or 1940.The plaintiff, Roscoe Williams, exercising his statutory right created
by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 8, 50 U. S. C. A.
App. § 308, within the prescribed ninety days after discharge, reclaimed his job with defendant, Sinclair Refining Company, that he
had left upon entry into the armed services. The defendant company was desirous of honoring the plaintiff's request; however, the
Oil Workers International Union, which was under contract with
the defendant, through a legally constituted committee, protested his
receiving the seniority provided for by the Veterans' Act. The issue
was submitted to the Board of Arbitrators, a decision being rendered
against the plaintiff who was not present at the arbitration. Williams
brought this action to recover damages in the amount of the difference
between wages he would have earned had his seniority rights been
recognized and the earnings actually received. The Sinclair Refining
Company has impleaded the Oil Workers International Union, as a
third party defendant, charging interference by the union which prevented the defendant company from recognizing the plaintiff's seniority rights and deprived him of the wages he would have received
in recognition thereof. Held, judgment for plaintiff ordered against
the third party defendant in the amount demanded. Williams v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 74 F. Supp. 139 (N. D. Tex. 1947).
The court first considers Williams' right to bring this action,
and resolves the question in the plaintiff's favor. Since Williams was
not present at, nor invited to, the arbitration, where his claim for
recognition of seniority rights under the Veterans' Act was decided
against him, it is presumed that he was represented by the union which
was also the bargaining agent of the other claimant for the job. On
a familiar and settled principle of law, it cannot be said that Williams
had any representation at the arbitration, since the union could not
-

TRADE UNIONS-SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE

17

Laws of Pennsylvania, Apportionment Act of 1937, P. L. 2762.
Maryland 1937, c. 546.

Is Laws of

